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This is a very interesting, very provocative, sometimes quite helpful, sometimes quite 
frustrating book, and it is these things on a wide range of topics. Charles Mills is deter-
mined, more or less singlehandedly, to make race, and race consciousness, play the role 
it deserves to play in philosophy at long last, and by “philosophy,” I mean – and Mills 
means –the political philosophy of today, dominated as it is by near fifty years of John 
Rawls  and all the disfigurements Mills thinks such domination has brought in its train. 
Mills’ relation to Rawls is complex. The list of all the things that Mills thinks Rawls either 
gets wrong or wrongfully ignores is long – too long for any brief recapitulation, though 
details of some of it will occupy us shortly. And it is not only Rawls himself that Mills 
wants to criticize. Throughout, Mills wants to draw our attention to the limitations of 
Rawls’ overall orientation, that of “Ideal Theory.” Perhaps it is not Rawls’ fault that this 
approach has dominated political philosophy to the extent it has. A philosopher is gener-
ally not responsible for the good fortune of being so pervasively followed by others! But 
the limitations of ideal theory are, Mills thinks, at this point, too widespread to accept 
without critique any longer. And yet, Mills thinks the general orientation we inherit 
from Rawls, that of an original position, should it be informed appropriately by history 
and historical consciousness, could serve as the right framework for the particular “Non-
Ideal Theory” he thinks right. This would have as its aim the project of figuring out what 
corrective justice calls for, where race is concerned.
As I say, there is a lot of variety in the topics taken up. The book is in fact composed 
of several more or less stand alone chapters on discrete race related subjects, and the 
discussion in many cases is far too brief. Mills has a tendency to quote a source and 
take that as sufficient argument for the point at hand. This can rankle. A reader may not 
agree that so and so “has clearly shown that” all knowledge is thoroughly social in nature 
(for example; see p.60), but Mills tends to think he can just describe and pass on the 
conclusions of others – if these are conclusions that he likes - without too much worry. 
More troubling is that important accusations are sometimes made with far too broad a 
brush. Throughout the book, there are claims of “white philosophy” “ignoring” issues 
of corrective justice in the racial domain that made at least this reader scratch his head 
in puzzlement. Ronald Dworkin, about as prominent an example of white Euro centric 
Rawls influenced philosophy as can be imagined, spent a large chunk of his remarkably 
productive career writing long, (very long) essays and book chapters justifying affirma-
tive action on numerous grounds since the Bakke case, and he has done so for the general 
public as well as for academia. “Why Bakke Has No Case” was originally published in 
The New York Review of Books before Bakke was even decided! Who else but Dworkin 
could construct the distinction between “equal treatment” and “treatment as an equal” 
and argue that Bakke had a right to one, but not the other? I will have more to say about 
affirmative action, Mills’ view of it, and his complaints about its general treatment in phi-
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losophy and our political culture below. But the idea, encountered over and over again 
in Black Rights / White Wrongs, that “corrective justice” in racial matters is generally ig-
nored, when he sees affirmative action as justified on corrective justice grounds, is simply 
provocation. It just ain’t true, and I am sure he knows it.
There is a lot in this book that is simply just terrific fun, fun to read and very worthwhile 
to think about. There is a chapter on “white ignorance,” drawing impressively on black 
literary work, such as Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (54) and white literary work too, 
such as Melville’s deeply strange Benito Cereno (54, 55). The complex relation between 
racial subordination and a kind of “invisibility” is indeed generally ignored in philoso-
phy, and Mills is quite right to turn to literature as offering a more fertile ground when 
taking up this topic. Parenthetically, there was once a time when it was not uncommon 
for philosophers to draw upon literary treatments of a subject in their explorations, and 
this is far less so now. It is nice to see this practice revived here. There is a nice chapter 
on Kant’s secret, or at least generally ignored, racism (94). Mills here is part of a grow-
ing trend in philosophy to see Kant more accurately in this regard, and in the opinion of 
this reviewer, Kant is probably headed towards a status like that of Aristotle’s, where the 
racism (or sexism) of the thinker is increasingly openly acknowledged, but what follows 
from such views for the seemingly non-biased conception of the person at the center of 
the theory is not obvious. An inclusive conception of definitional teleology (Aristotle), 
a non-racist conception of persons and autonomy (Kant), are likely to continue to oc-
cupy a central place in moral theory. Mills seems to endorse a “black radical Kantianism” 
himself when constructing his own corrective theory (209). But he draws our attention 
to this feature of Kant to remind his readers, once again, of how pervasive self- deception 
can be where race is concerned (108, 109). There are constant reminders of the apparent 
asymmetry between race and gender when it comes to Anglo American philosophy’s 
correcting prior lacunae. So, the degree to which feminist criticisms of liberalism have 
now been incorporated into political philosophy’s conception of itself cannot be denied. 
This stands in sharp, and sad, contrast to race, where criticisms of Rawls from a racial 
perspective remain almost entirely absent from the mainstream anthologies (139 – 144).
But I think it is fair to say that for most philosophers, the essence of the book, what 
makes it most important, are the criticisms made of Rawls, and by extension, of ideal 
theory in general. As I say, for all the criticisms, Mills thinks an altered Rawlsian frame-
work, one where parties were suitably informed of our history of white supremacy, could 
be adopted to the very non-ideal task of corrective justice where racial wrongs are con-
cerned. Unfortunately, this counter argument is barely sketched out in Black Rights / 
White Wrongs; my discussion of it will be somewhat sketch like too. Let us turn then to 
argument against Ideal Theory. For whatever the limitations of Mills’ own conception of 
how to theorize corrective justice might be, he has done contemporary political philoso-
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phy a true service by forcing it to confront not merely the limitations of Ideal Theory, but 
the way Ideal Theory cannot help but present those limitations as benign or unimport-
ant. They are, Mills argues convincingly, neither of these things at all.
Ideal Theory, opening considerations
The term “ideal” can mean a great many things, and Mills is duly sensitive to this point 
(73). But when Rawls talks about his theory in A Theory of Justice as an “Ideal Theory” 
what he means is pretty clear, and certainly by now, pretty well known. And so, to re-
hearse: We are assuming society is a certain kind of “cooperative venture” entered into 
for “mutual advantage.” (Mills refers to this language and to its remarkable distance from 
reality constantly.) We are assuming that, whatever the ideal principles of justice turn out 
to be, that there will be near perfect compliance with such principles; we will not worry 
about what society would be like were there widespread subversion of the law. We are 
assuming we are starting de novo, and that there are no wrongs inherited from the past 
that must be attended to and corrected. We are assuming equality among citizens, and 
more or less equal deliberative rationality, so we may assume all are equally capable of as-
sessing and, if need be, altering, their life plans. Rawls of course famously does not deny 
that the problems of corrective justice (for example) are in many ways “more urgent,” 
but as he famously also says, the best way into these difficulties, the difficulties posed by 
corrective justice say, lies in figuring out what the ideal requires first, for then, presum-
ably, we know at last what we are aiming for. The Ideal rightly claims priority, (so says 
the Rawlsian) because the normative project posed by corrective justice needs to get its 
normative content from what the world would be like (or would have been like) were we 
not to have this project to concern us in the first place. Only if we know what justice is, as 
such one might say, or, what the just society would be like apart from any particular his-
torical story, can we then turn to the task of bringing our unhappy, historically tortured, 
state closer in alignment with this description.
Well, it sort of makes sense. And yet Mills is also rightly skeptical. Of course, of course 
– Mills knows that the Rawlsian is not saying there is no place for theorizing about cor-
rective justice, or saying it is not a worthy, even “urgent” matter. The Rawlsian hardly 
thinks that with the publication of A Theory of Justice, all reflection on whether a fire 
department may justifiably advance minorities at the expense of non-minorities, would 
cease! The Rawlsian is only saying that surely, this – saying what the basic structure of 
society should be – is the logically prior task, since it is here that we will figure out what 
justice really means. How can we say that the present situation of blacks in America is 
unjust, how say how unjust it is, unless we have some idea of what justice is? And how 
can we have that idea unless….we construct an ideal theory of justice!
It is here that I think Mills is on to something very deep, and because of the nature of di-
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agnosis, something mainstream Anglo American philosophy is in fact especially poorly 
equipped to detect. The problem (borrowing from G.A. Cohen here) lies one might say 
in the “ethos” of Ideal Theory, the conception implicitly conveyed by the nature of the 
argument regarding what is and is not important. It is not just that the assumptions 
made, say that persons will be rational, or will act in compliance with the principles cho-
sen, generating a well-ordered society, take us away from worrying about the subjects 
that are, from the standpoint of pragmatic urgency, exactly what should be confronted 
and puzzled over. Perhaps that is entirely forgivable, since, again, it will be said that 
such things are just set aside for separate treatment. And after all, what else could Ideal 
Theory be? Rather, the problem is that what is left out, set aside, gets to be seen, almost 
inadvertently, as something easy, something we can turn to later without any serious dif-
ficulty, something not all that deep really. And sometimes in fact, this is indeed so. So, 
consider something like health say. Of course, as actual persons, our health is sometimes 
of very great concern to us. A lack of it can even kill us. Obviously. And yet there is noth-
ing wrong with setting this all aside, having the parties under the veil just know in this 
abstract sense that, once the veil is lifted, some will be healthy, some not, that people get 
less healthy, generally, as they age, and so forth. But do these considerations pose a deep 
problem for philosophy? Hardly. Anyone ranting and raving to the Rawlsian: “But you 
have left out health! Something so important to us as actual persons!” would have missed 
the point, and structure, of Rawls’ argument entirely. And the ideology of Ideal Theory 
encourages us to see any feature of actual life, or actual history, along these lines – messy, 
sure, awfully pressing in real life to be sure, but nothing to distract us from theory con-
struction, nothing we cannot just fill in the empirical details of later, and correct, or 
regulate if need be, by reference to the two principles of justice. 
Let us take a better example for the Rawlsian, something with some, if in the end benign, 
political content. Consider the following: it can be conceded I think that when the veil is 
lifted, some might have anti-Semitic ideas. But surely the first principle of justice chosen 
under the veil would act as a brake on such views and prevent them from gaining any 
sort of traction in a well-ordered society. That there are actual anti-Semites in real life 
seems, from the standpoint of Ideal Theory, more or less benign. It is hardly something 
that need distract us; the fact, conceded, hardly calls for a revision of the theory.
No, these worries are indeed not real worries at all. The Rawlsian can chuckle kindly 
from his Olympian heights and get on with the business of defending the difference 
principle. But it would be a mistake to think this sort of story is always the one on hand. 
And here we can take a page from feminism. Of course, under the veil of ignorance, par-
ties would not know their gender, and, being risk averse, would choose principles that 
are non-gender discriminatory. But the feminist argues – rightly I think we would all say 
now – this is but part of the story, the tip of the iceberg. In this case, that metaphor is near 
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literal, since it is what is hidden that most warrants our attention. The history of men and 
women is a history of seeing women’s domestic life, the work of child rearing and fam-
ily support, as “private,” not even really “work” in the first place, not at least as that idea 
is understood in classical social theory. It is these unspoken assumptions, the ideology 
of male domination, that must be brought out of invisibility and subjected to scrutiny. 
And indeed, prodded by criticism, Rawls has done so – there is no need to rehearse his 
trajectory on this subject in any detail. Worries about justice in the family, or what is ac-
ceptable between men and women in marriage, are now explicit, and explicitly part of 
the background understandings that inform principle determination.
One might think that the feminist argument against earlier forms of liberalism gives us a 
straightforward blueprint when it comes to what it would be to construct an analogously 
racially motivated critique. Mills certainly wants to make what is in some ways a parallel 
point about racial domination. It too is hidden, under ideal theory’s talk of inclusiveness 
and the present preference in white political thought for a “color blind” approach to race 
(5, 6). But the analogy is inexact, though it is not easy to say, in a satisfactory way, exactly 
why this is so. Certainly some asymmetries are obvious. As Hume quite rightly pointed 
out against Hobbes about two hundred years ago, men are not really so very solitary after 
all. The attraction between the sexes and the project of raising children, deeply rooted in 
our biological nature, has men and women in some kind of intimate life from the time 
we are this species at all. By contrast, race is a modern construction, not a fact of biol-
ogy (4, 8, 56), and members of one race did live in isolation from others for centuries. 
Many continue to live in real isolation from members of another race now, obviously. 
And once racial domination does arise, it would seem it has distinct, hard to pin down 
causal consequences all its own. Parenthetically, I should say, Mills quite rightly, wants to 
make this the correct way of picking out the central subject here – we are talking about 
racial domination, or white supremacy, (Mills uses this term in the broadest sense), not 
“prejudice” or “bias” understood as a psychological attitude or set of beliefs. What counts 
is the systematic civic suppression of a group by systems or institutions of power, not 
the presence or absence of some inner state in some person who self identifies as white 
(117). Clearly, a person without any such prejudicial beliefs could all the same passively 
participate in a system that fails to see blacks as equally deserving of a mortgage, or could 
fail to appreciate the degree to which the criminal justice system sentences drug offend-
ers asymmetrically along racial lines, and so on. It is not private thoughts that are the 
object of scrutiny here, it is what actually happens. It is institutional operations, some-
times explicitly racially motivated, sometimes not, that generate differentials along racial 
lines to the detriment of black Americans that is our subject. But having identified the 
subject, it is now bewilderingly complicated how to proceed. The techniques required to 
ensure fairness in lending will not be same as combatting racially motivated arrest and 
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sentencing, let alone racially motivated police brutality. And it is very unclear the bear-
ing all of this has as a critique of Ideal Theory. How much does taking up the history of 
racial domination and its consequences just mean that we have, when we think about 
race and justice, simply a very different subject from what Rawls is concerned with? Or, 
will acknowledging racial domination and its history mean the concepts or arguments 
employed in A Theory of Justice are corrupt or compromised in a way that bears on their 
philosophical integrity?
In one respect, it is enough for Mills to argue the first, and that the “ethos” of white Anglo 
American philosophy has been, for nearly fifty years now, in a bit of a self- congratulatory 
bubble, failing to see how trivial it is to run an argument like that of Rawls’ when actual 
“liberal” society is so shot through with racially motivated injustice. It is hard to see the 
point of characterizing “society” as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage (as Rawls 
repeatedly puts it) – to take but one example – when in fact it seems more accurately 
described as a social hierarchy where racial domination is as much a collective motiva-
tor as anything else is. It is hard to see the point of characterizing the parties under veil 
of ignorance as rational self-interested proxies for any possible future person, and then, 
to imagine future persons as generally in compliance with the principles chosen under 
such circumstances. (76, 77) If this is the framework, racial domination as a collective 
social force – as opposed to the mere possibility of particular individuals having private 
beliefs with biased content – quite disappears under this double movement. It is not a 
topic for us when we are under the veil (fair enough, one might say), or in any actual state 
(and that cannot be right). And of course, as Rawls himself says, quite openly, nothing in 
his argument can take up whatever problems are posed by “corrective” justice – what we 
ought to do when some wrong has already been done. Corrective justice as a general sub-
ject will include, obviously, conceptions of criminal justice and tort liability, but in the 
context of racial oppression, it is pointedly about what, if anything, is to be done for past 
acts of racially motivated expropriation and subordination. Here the central topics are 
two: affirmative action and reparations. And one of Mills’ recurring points throughout 
Black Rights/White Wrongs is this: If you are bewitched by Ideal Theory, as contemporary 
Anglo-American philosophy has been, then you just won’t pay much attention to those 
issues that fall outside of it, i.e., those of corrective justice, which is to say, specifically, 
affirmative action and reparations. And given the importance and urgency of these mat-
ters to those who are the victims of ongoing systematic oppression, this is kind of an 
embarrassment, something almost shameful for philosophy today.
As I have said, I think Mills exaggerates the degree to which affirmative action fails to 
receive attention from philosophers and philosophically inclined legal theorists (Judge 
Richard Posner is a clear example of my point here). But I also want to dispute the char-
acterization of affirmative action policies as essentially or always instances of “corrective” 
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justice in the first place. By “affirmative action” I will mean any policy that distributes 
a good (e.g., a place in an incoming college class, a promotion to police captain, a city 
contract, etc.) by reference to explicitly racial criteria, whatever other criteria are also in 
play (grades, years on the job, past experience in the trade, and so forth.). What Mills 
tends to leave out in Black Rights / White Wrongs is that these policies can draw upon 
several distinct justification stories; on my view (and the Court’s), they are not always 
best thought of as correcting for a past wrong. Mills thinks white philosophers don’t like 
to think about corrective justice in the racial context, so besotted are they with the lofty 
vistas offered by the two principles of justice and the well-ordered society. I don’t think 
this is quite so, but if it were, if Mills were right here, then, there is all the more reason to 
think about the ways affirmative action might embody other aspirations besides those of 
correcting for a past wrong. I will say more about what those aspirations might be later 
on. Let us turn now to corrective justice.
Mills and Corrective Justice
The reader may be surprised to learn that Mills offers no theory of corrective justice him-
self, no argument as to what should count and why, and what by contrast should be set 
aside. There is only just the frequent claim that it is a wrongly neglected topic. And so: I 
offer here a brief primer to get this discussion off the ground.
Obviously, corrective justice works best, by which I mean, is most unproblematically 
instantiated, when the agent who committed the wrong can restore the loss to the very 
same person who suffered that wrong. Bob wrongly took Carl’s car and bent the fender.
Bob pays to have the fender repaired and returns the car to Carl. That is about as good, as 
clear, a case of corrective justice as one could wish. Of course – and this is very, very im-
portant – in the affirmative action and reparations case, we won’t usually have anything 
like this at all. Sometimes we do. Sometimes it is the exact same fire department that 
acted discriminatorily that now seeks to correct for this and it is the same population of 
candidates who will now be promoted, But, as Justice Scalia loved to say, this is barely 
affirmative action. When the parties who committed the wrong and the parties who suf-
fered the wrong are the same parties before us, then we can just draw on standard tort 
law principles of rectification too, and there is not going to be anything terribly difficult, 
anything philosophically or legally troubling, about that.
And it is just this we usually don’t have. We won’t typically have the original victims of 
the original wrong before us, and sometimes we won’t have the same perpetrators of the 
initial wrong before us either. Germany pays Israel reparations over the Holocaust, but 
the recipients of that money are by and large ordinary Israelis, not Holocaust victims. At 
some point very near, there won’t even be any Holocaust victims among us to begin with. 
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And on the other side of the equation, the present government of Germany is very, very 
discontinuous from the murderous Nazi regime that perpetrated these wrongs. I have 
not said any of that matters, not yet – though it is pretty obvious that none of this can be 
entirely irrelevant either. For now, I am just pointing out the gradual movement we have 
here. On one end of the spectrum is what one might call the “pure” case of restitution 
or correction, where the party who corrects the injury is the same one who perpetrated 
the wrong, the party who receives the compensation is the same one who suffered it. At 
the other end will be cases where the wrong occurred long ago, or over a long period 
of time such that the victims, or a significant fraction of them, and the wrongdoer, are 
no longer with us. I think it is rather obvious that the more one moves away from the 
pure restitution story, the more problematic the justification story becomes. If the victim 
is not around, but only descendants, this matters; the more attenuated the connection 
becomes, this matters too. If the apparatchiks of 1948 Communist Czechoslovakia ap-
propriated a farm, and there are now no descendants but the farmer’s grandson’s Irish 
spouse, it is not clear she has any claim at all. If Stalin’s puppet Czech government has 
long since disappeared and we have a very different government in place now, as we do 
(we don’t even have that state anymore), it is not clear that this government, the present 
government, has any responsibility for the  crimes committed by this other, earlier, very 
different state either. If the farm has long since been turned into an apartment complex 
with many innocent families living there, families who had nothing, clearly, to do with 
the earlier wrong, it is hardly obvious that they must now leave so that the cows may yet 
return. I am not saying these problems cannot be faced. To the contrary, I am saying they 
must be faced.
Mills knows all this of course. He has to; these considerations arise very quickly when-
ever the subject of restitution arises too. But he does not like to acknowledge the difficul-
ties with restitution when the variables get filled in in non-ideal ways, as it were, because 
he likes to present “white resistance” to restitution claims as racially motivated rather 
than, as it well might be, motivated by principled difficulties with the policy, once the 
variables become, as I say, “attenuated,” or non-standard, as they surely must be, when 
the wrongs occur over a three hundred year period, and at a point in history when the 
government was so different that something as abhorrent as slavery was actually feder-
ally enforced. Many Americans think, not unreasonably, that they are too discontinuous 
with the perpetrators of the initial injustices to be financially liable, in tort, as it were, 
for their compensation now. I am not saying there are not good counter arguments. Of 
course there are. I am saying Mills does his opponents a disservice when he characterizes 
resistance to such policies as inevitably expressing a kind of blindness to the causation 
story where race is concerned, as reflecting a self-serving false consciousness, that of 
thinking a “color blind” approach to race is all we now need. To be sure, Mills is abso-
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lutely right about one thing. There is a lot of bad faith on this issue, I do not deny it. But 
there is not only bad faith. There are some very good reasons to demur as well. But they 
are, believe it or not, never mentioned in Black Rights/ White Wrongs.
And this brings me back to affirmative action. Precisely because there are difficulties 
with compensatory arguments, sometimes it is nice to be able to draw upon non- com-
pensatory arguments instead. Let me illustrate what I mean. Affirmative action policies 
in college admissions are essentially justified before the courts by being said to contrib-
ute to the diversity of the educational experience (Bakke, Fullilove). School boards may 
distribute students along racial lines in order to bring their schools more in line with the 
racial make-up of their district (Seattle Schools). Management may think of affirmative 
action as advancing something of a racial ideal, bringing the racial make-up of the work-
force more in line with the community it resides in (Weber). In these justification stories, 
it is not necessary to speak of correcting for a past wrong, let alone a wrong committed 
by the same institution that is now enacting the policy in question. A university admis-
sions office does not have to show it acted prejudicially in the past in order to take race 
into account in its admissions policies now. A police department does not have be found 
guilty of past discrimination in order to justify pursuit of a racial target in the present 
make-up of its officers. A school board need not be guilty of past racial redlining in or-
der to worry now about the distribution of its students along racial lines and subsequent 
“racial isolation.” It is worth remembering that affirmative action was so named, during 
the Nixon years, precisely because it expresses an interest in taking affirmative steps to 
bring America closer to the inclusive society it ought to be – we need not wait for a claim 
of compensatory justice to be vindicated in order to take these affirmative steps.
Of course, it is natural to think: But what difference does it make if the institution did 
not commit the wrong – what matters is that the wrong was committed and the institu-
tion can do something to fix it. So, to continue the line of argument: surely it should not 
matter that the University of Davis Medical School did not itself act prejudicially in the 
past. Let us grant that this is so. What matters is that blacks were and are the victims of 
discrimination, and Davis can, with its affirmative action policies, do a little bit to fix 
that. Isn’t that enough? Well, no, it isn’t, and Mills knows this. When an institution dis-
tributes a good it is empowered to distribute along racially explicit lines, it must show it 
is pursuing a “legitimate purpose,” which is to say, a purpose that it, as that institution, 
is legally entitled to have. And it must show it is pursuing this purpose in a reasonable 
way. And courts will assess an institution’s claims that it has such a purpose and is pur-
suing it reasonably by a high standard of review, “strict scrutiny.” So for example, the 
city of Richmond can worry about the way minorities in Richmond were treated in the 
past when city contracts were handed out (Croson). It cannot worry about the welfare 
of minorities as such, so that a Latino from Arizona or an Innuit from Alaska may seek 
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support in city contract distribution now (which in fact was how the Richmond ordi-
nance was written). If it is going to require that 30% be subcontracted to minority owned 
enterprises, and not 20% (or any other number) it better be able to justify this target by 
reference to more than mere hope (which it could not – not because the number could 
not be justified – we will never know – Richmond just failed to do the necessary work). 
A bunch of philosophy professors on a graduate admissions committee may legitimately 
worry about diversity of education when considering applicants, it may not worry about 
combatting discrimination in America overall, about which they know little, and which 
they were hardly appointed or elected to pursue.
Now, one might argue that the current legal framework for assessing affirmative action 
plans is all wrong, and that local institutions ought to be able to have more general, 
even, if you will, abstract, goals, such as “combatting discrimination overall,” or “making 
America a less racially stratified society.” Or one might argue that the “legitimate pur-
pose” requirement is all right, but that the standard of review should be more relaxed. 
Fine. These are perfectly reasonable things to think. Then make that argument. Take up 
the problems with institutional over reach, consider whether this general goal should be 
granted all institutions, or just those that play a special role in American society, such 
as public schools or the army or local police and fire departments (this is the position 
I myself favor) and say why you think the line should be drawn in this way rather than 
in some other. Take up whether this grant of abstract moral purpose should come via a 
democratic process, such as an act of state legislature, or Congress, or whether it should 
come as a matter of constitutional interpretation through the courts.
Face it out. But Mills never does. We just have this “thing,” this undigested lump called 
“affirmative action,” about which “white philosophers” are evasive or resistant because of 
an ideology of “color blindness” or “white ignorance.” Sorry. No sale.
And now to Mills and Rawls
As I said earlier, if Black Rights / White Wrongs has a single unifying theme, it is the 
distortive influence Rawls and Ideal Theory has had on contemporary political thought, 
particularly, at this point in our history, at the expense of racial justice theory (it is now 
no longer right to say at the expense of feminist considerations). But the exact nature of 
the distortion is unclear. I do not mean this remark as a criticism – it really is unclear just 
what to make of this emphasis on the Ideal at the expense of the Corrective. Consider the 
following, in ascending order of severity:
1. The obsessive focus on Ideal theory has taken for granted what we should be 
attending to;Rawlsian Ideal Theory fails to make conceptual space for the tools or 
the concepts we need when taking up corrective justice – in racial matters;
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corrective justice theory, especially in so far as it takes up the wrongful expropriation of 
property and wealth from Native Americans and African Americans, is in fact conceptu-
ally prior to Ideal Theory, or conceptually linked to Ideal Theory, in that notions such as 
“property” cannot be deployed without first thinking through the corrective claims such 
groups will rightfully make.
I think Mills wants to say all three, and I think all three are in fact plausible things to say, 
but there is more to the story than the accusation, and I want to ventilate the argument 
a bit on both sides. The first claim is easy and sort of undeniable. Sure, the amount of 
energy that has been spent on Rawls and the veil of ignorance over the past fifty years 
is simply mind boggling, as any google search will show. I think Rawls has done us all a 
world of good in making redistribution of wealth an impossible to avoid topic in con-
temporary thoughts about justice, but the formidability of the theory, and the attention 
it has received, has crowded out, one might say, attention to race among philosophers. 
Looking back, this obsessive attention to Rawls’ argument, and what was lost as a result, 
does seem a bit unfortunate, especially when one remembers how much we all lose in the 
tragedy that is race in America. Let us concede that some form of this point is reasonable 
and move on.
The second point is a fertile one, and I hope Mills succeeds in getting more philosophers 
to pay attention to it. A sketch of it came up in the discussion of how the veil of ignorance 
and then the well-ordered society would handle anti-Semitism. It is a possible state of 
mind in the first and a possibly instantiated state of mind in the second, and it is pre-
vented from having any authority because of the well-known argument that, combining 
self-interest, ignorance, and risk aversion, would end up with principles that would pre-
vent such states of mind from having any political authority, were they to be actualized. 
But while I think this argument, this framework, is quite all right before what is arguably 
a marginal phenomenon in American life, it fails to capture, by which I mean, adequately 
represent, the nature of group power, or group dynamics, so central to thinking help-
fully about race. (127, 128) The idea that people, or citizens, might identify as members 
of a race, and, as such, seek to deny members of another equal protection under the law, 
simply gets no foothold in this highly individualistic ontology.
Consider, by contrast, justice in economic distribution. Here the claim that Ideal Theory 
has, or ought to have, a kind of priority seems plausible. We run the argument of A 
Theory of Justice, wind up with the Difference Principle, and then, looking at our actual 
society say, “Aha! Gosh, we are not like this at all (whereas Sweden sort of is). Let’s cor-
rect this, by which we mean, let us bring our actual society more in compliance with this 
state, which we now know, via Ideal Theory, to be just.” Here, the Ideal Theory truly does 
give us the right target (presumably). It also points us smoothly towards the “corrective” 
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stance, where we turn to the task of realizing it. The project of correction is straightfor-
ward, because there is nothing in the Ideal argument that prevents us from accurately 
representing the thing to be corrected.
But it is exactly this that is not so when it comes to race and racial domination. And that 
is the problem. When we lift the veil, if we remain faithful to the vocabulary we have 
inherited from Rawls, we simply see some people with less money (say) who happen, 
disproportionately, to be of a certain color. Why can’t redistribution of the money then 
in compliance with the difference principle be enough? Actually, we will get to just that 
when we take up Mills’ dispute with Tommie Shelby below, but for now, the point is one 
of description, not rectification. We cannot even characterize the situation of blacks in 
America accurately in the first place. There is no place for white supremacy or racial 
exclusion. We cannot describe what is wrong. There are only individual preferences that 
would be deemed too risky under conditions of ignorance. Cooperative, organized, ra-
cially motivated disenfranchisement, often informal, cannot be anticipated under the 
veil of ignorance, so it cannot be taken up or guarded against. And if we cannot even 
describe the political plight of those who are the subject of racially motivated inequality 
at all accurately in the first place when within a certain theory, how can that theory be 
deemed satisfactory? As I say, I find this criticism quite powerful as far as it goes. Rawls’ 
liberalism just fails to do justice to a more demanding, more subtle social ontology, and 
if we going to think helpfully about race, that is precisely the social ontology we are go-
ing to need.
Finally, we have the challenge that some ideas central to the deployment of Ideal Theory, 
notably property, will require grappling with corrective theory first. So Rawls assumes, 
plausibly, that actual persons will have more or less Lockian intuitions about what they 
make, and parties under the veil of ignorance will see such intuitions as having some 
weight. It is just this that generates the difference principle, since the difference principle 
balances concern for political equality, ensuring that all with reasonable life plans will 
have a decent chance at their fulfillment, regardless of their talent, with some regard for 
Lockian entitlement, for the thought that effort and talent will not make no difference 
to outcome either. After all, even in Sweden, the talented surgeon makes more than the 
orderly, the CEO of Volvo makes more than the factory worker, and the members of 
Abba make more than the music studio maintenance crew. But not that much more such 
that the least advantaged in these stories cannot have enough to have reasonably good 
lives too. As lack of talent does not mean one has less of a vote, or less legal protection 
when a defendant, it will not mean no access to the goods necessary for a reasonable life 
either. This seems fine, so far. But suppose the underlying basis of all property has been 
compromised from the start. Suppose all the real property there is has all been wrong-
fully taken, and so, until the compensation has been paid, what citizens are entitled to 
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“from their own efforts” must remain unclear. When we think about America and the 
initial expropriation of the indigenous peoples, this is not a very far-fetched thing to 
say. I note in passing it is not so powerful a thing to say about the Finns, or the Poles. (I 
am careful enough to choose European nations that extracted no wealth from colonial 
possession either.) It is also of unclear force when we think about intellectual or creative 
work. Whatever the wrongs of white expropriation of Native American land may be, and 
they are pretty considerable, they seem to have little bearing on Stevie Wonder’s claim to 
some significant share of the wealth from the sale of “You Are The Sunshine of My Life,” 
a song he, and he alone, undoubtedly wrote.
All right, suppose we set cases like these aside and return to the case where this is unde-
niably a very powerful point. It is just true that all the land in America was indeed taken. 
It was not “virgin land” in some Locke-like fantasy, and it was wrongfully expropriated. 
But from the standpoint of Ideal Theory, acknowledging this fact it may not be so formi-
dable a difficulty. The Rawlsian can acknowledge that his theory requires an equal or fair 
starting point. Indeed, he should insist upon it, and he can concede that this can only be 
achieved when have first figured out what is owed to whom, if there are wrongs in the 
past of our actual society that stand in need of correcting. All this I think can even be 
included under a modified, or reformed, theory of what can be thought of as “general 
knowledge” under the veil of ignorance. But I see no reason why the Rawlsian cannot 
then go on to say: once that initial starting point has been achieved, then, it is the fair 
equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle that should govern. And 
“property,” following the argument, will then be understood along difference principle-
compliant lines: persons will retain as exclusively theirs only that fraction which is nec-
essary for an arrangement that is to the benefit of the least advantaged. So on my view, 
the most powerful challenge to Ideal Theory generated from the standpoint of race-
critique lies in the second point: the Ideal Theory Rawls offers fails to do justice to, fails 
to represent, racial domination at all satisfactorily. It cannot include it in the a-historical 
original position, and it cannot make sense of its emergence or force in actual society.
But Can the Two Principles Solve the Problem of Race All the Same?
Still, maybe this does not matter so very much. After all, a society in compliance with 
the two principles would be just, yes? And surely, on one level at least, that is all we can 
ask for. What possible social pathology could co-exist with such compliance? What in-
justice (one might say) could possibly co-exist alongside the just state? Maybe it is true 
that Rawls argument cannot do justice to the distinct, sociologically complex, phenom-
enon of race domination. Perhaps no purely philosophical argument ever could. But if 
compliance with what the theory requires would essentially dismantle the effects of racial 
oppression, then, the fact that the theory fails to “characterize” racial domination satis-
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factorily may not matter so much. Consider: suppose a monk preaching the principles 
of Zen can get anyone who follows him to have a serene life. Suppose he knows little 
about post-traumatic stress disorder, has no idea about war. Still, veterans who follow his 
teachings are, in my fantasy example, all better, well-adjusted and secure. Does it really 
matter very much that the monk in question knows very little about the pathology he 
can make go away? Perhaps the Rawlsian is in a similar position.
Maybe the theory cannot adequately represent the nature of racial domination an op-
pression, but if compliance with the two principles would make its effects    disappear, 
perhaps this is a forgivable lapse.
Well, it is an interesting thought, and goes hand in hand with a very interesting issue in 
political theory generally. Most social pathologies are coextensive under several alterna-
tive descriptions, and if a theory targets the phenomenon under one of these descrip-
tions, the fact that it fails to have the vocabulary to pick it out under any of the others 
may not matter. Malnutrition is usually coextensive with poverty; if you target and al-
leviate poverty, chances are you will alleviate malnutrition too. A more subtle example 
might lie in depression among the rural poor. Chances are, if you targeted unemploy-
ment, made headway there, depression, drug addiction and suicide rates would go down 
too, even if all you ever cared about was unemployment. A Benthamite utilitarian will 
hold that all the benefits and injuries known to man are captured in this single metric of 
“utility” – so long as you worry about that in the right way, the theory assures us, all will 
be well. And so it is here, perhaps. Suppose we just do what Rawls’ theory says we ought 
to do – arrange things so that there are equal basic liberties, fair opportunity, and the 
distribution of primary goods is optimal for the least advantaged.
Won’t that be good enough? I don’t mean that in the sense that this is a reasonable utopia, 
and how could we ask for more. Rather I mean it in the sense that, if we do manage to do 
this, won’t we, at the same time, alleviate the traces of racial oppression too, whether we 
explicitly target such things or not?
Tommie Shelby seems to think so, in a qualified way. When I say “in a qualified way” I 
mean this in two senses. First, to my surprise, Shelby leans almost exclusively on Rawls’ 
fair equality of opportunity principle (what gets called throughout the FEO), and not at 
all on the difference principle, so it remains open how much further along these lines we 
might go were to think about aggressive compliance with the difference principle as well. 
Second, Shelby is circumspect and speculative in his thought here.
Aggressive enactment of the FEO “might well” alleviate most of the residual traces of 
past institutional racism, and “might well” in time even lead to less racial resentment of 
whites among blacks, less interest in reparations, given the improvement in their status 
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such enforcement would bring (165, 166). Shelby’s is almost a modus tollens argument. 
Given that institutional white supremacy has historically deprived blacks of basic lib-
erties and fair opportunity, rigorous enforcement of these political goods, particularly 
(now) fair opportunity, would correct a grievous political injury (166). Of course, given 
the structure of Rawls’ argument, where we worry about fair equality of opportunity and 
the difference principle “lexically,” which is to say, only after equal basic liberties have 
been secured, we can assume blacks also have equal, robust, basic liberties on par with 
whites in this scenario too. One might put Shelby’s point this way: if blacks really were 
given equal basic liberties, and really given fair equality of opportunity, the traces of his-
torical racism would be effectively countered.
Of course, Shelby hardly thinks this is simply achieved by judicial order! He is a realist. 
He understands “opportunity” as growing out of access to important social goods, and so 
these goods would be subject to substantial, perhaps even radical, redistribution. Educa-
tional resources, to take an obvious example, would have to be radically reallocated if we 
were to achieve anything like fair equality of opportunity (166). Analogous, if perhaps 
less radical, measures would probably have to be taken with respect to health care and 
housing resources. But this is nothing new. Bringing American market capitalism into 
compliance with the difference principle would be no small matter of social engineering 
either. That is hardly a problem for Rawls. The point is clear and dear to the heart of any 
Rawlsian. If we really do follow this blueprint and 
1. secure equal basic liberties for all and 
2. secure fair equality of opportunity for all and then (a seemingly less important 
point for Shelby) 
3. allow differences in outcome only 
if they are part of a scheme that benefits the otherwise least advantaged, then, whether 
this outcome was an intended object of the theory or not, the traces and consequences of 
institutional racism would be effectively rectified.
Unsurprisingly, Mills demurs. I say “unsurprisingly” because of course he is hostile to the 
general argument here. He has said repeatedly throughout Black Rights / White Wrongs 
that he does not believe the Rawlsian framework, or the framework of any Ideal Theory, 
can be the right one when we turn to the task of correcting for the history of racial op-
pression or the nature of white supremacy (165-170). Indeed, if anything is a signature 
philosophical claim for Mills, this is it. And so, as we should expect, arguments of every 
stripe and variety are on offer against Shelby here.
That said, I was a bit surprised at the first of them. Mills actually makes something of an 
appeal to authority in a way I don’t think I have ever seen before, outside of the monas-
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tery that is. Mills says: If enacting the Rawlsian framework were sufficient for combat-
ting the legacy of institutional racism, surely Rawls would have made this argument 
himself when given the opportunity to do so. But in fact, Rawls in several places speaks 
of the problem of race as requiring a wholly different approach, and speaks of the argu-
ment in A Theory of Justice as ill-suited to the task (167, 168). Well, OK, maybe he does. 
But why should that matter? Given how wrong Mills takes Rawls to be about so many 
things, one may be forgiven for finding this a surprising place to show such deference. 
Maybe Quine didn’t see the connection between his doctrine of ontological relativity 
and a disquotational theory of truth (to which Quine was notoriously hostile), but what 
does that signify? Nothing at all as far as I can see. It is hardly an argument that friends 
of disquotational theory are in fact wrong when appealing to Quine in defending their 
view. In order to assess the argument, we have to assess the argument. I don’t think we 
get anywhere by quoting scripture.
And then there is some very tricky stuff about Shelby’s allegedly wrongful use of the fair 
opportunity principle to address something as central as racial oppression (168 - 170). 
Mills thinks Shelby’s use of this principle to address the pathologies of historical racism 
is a bit of “category mistake” (his actual expression, 169). Why? Because a principle of 
economic distribution is being deployed to handle a problem, inter alia, of fundamental 
rights. To get this argument and accusation off the ground, a bit of background and re-
construction is in order.
Mills notes that liberalism bifurcates: there is Nozickian, libertarian liberalism in which 
it is sufficient for the state to guarantee freedom from undue coercion. On this view, 
so long as freedom and autonomy are respected, we have a just state, and no economic 
disparities, so long as they were not produced by fraud or wrongful takings, on their 
own, can count against that verdict. And then, of course, there is more robust liberalism, 
Rawls being a paradigmatic example, where respect for persons means ensuring that all 
citizens, regardless of their talent at accumulating wealth in meritocratic competition, 
will receive help in realizing reasonable life plans. (177 – 178) Janitors may not drive 
Jaguars, but they will be able to take modest vacations and perhaps retire at the same age 
as surgeons. All liberals agree about the necessity of guaranteeing “basic liberties.” Only 
left-leaning liberals like Rawls insist on arrangements that produce greater economic 
equality and so something like closer parity in lives and life plans. Well, here is the prob-
lem. Under a regime of institutional racism, blacks do not have their “basic liberties” 
secured. That seems obvious. But when we turn to the instantiation of the fair equal 
opportunity principle, we must assume equal basic liberties are secured; that is what it 
means for it (and the difference principle) to be put forward as lexically secondary. If all 
these years of reading Rawls have taught us anything, it is that we must, when within the 
theory, satisfy the first principle of justice before turning to any feature of the second. 
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Shelby, therefore (Mills says), in appealing to the fair opportunity principle makes a kind 
of category mistake in that he takes a principle that figures in a certain species of liberal-
ism, one that worries essentially about economic outcome, and uses it to secure what all 
liberalism, or liberalism as such, worries about, basic political liberties. This is work this 
principle cannot do, the hoped-for result is one that enforcement of this principle cannot 
achieve.
On my view, this charge is a bit unfair, or, at the least, undeveloped, since it assumes that 
differences in meaning always give us differences in extension, and that is exactly what 
has to be shown in a case-by-case way. Sometimes these differences in meaning don’t 
amount to very much. Every utilitarian is attuned to the need to face this challenge, and 
Mill (not Mills) rose to occasion admirably in his “Justice and Utility,” when he begins by 
acknowledging that “justice” and “utility” don’t seem to mean the same thing – but then 
goes on to argue this appearance amounts to very little in the end, since attending to the 
second will always give you the first. (In referring to this argument, I hope it is clear I 
do not endorse it.) From the fact that the FEO is “about” economic distribution cannot, 
in itself, entail that a world in compliance with it would not be other things too. Obvi-
ously, Mills is on solid exegetical ground when he speaks of the “lexical priority” of basic 
liberty worries over those of economic distribution. And I suppose he is on reasonably 
solid ground when he speaks of blacks as not having their basic liberties secured, though 
I want to poke a bit at the ambiguities surrounding this claim in a moment. Inadver-
tently, I think Mills has pointed out how little this so called lexical priority may amount 
to in certain contexts. Remember: the justification for the difference principle – actually, 
for everything in the theory that speaks to a more egalitarian outcome as far as wealth is 
concerned – is a kind of “integrated Kantianism.” Rawls rightly was very proud of the way 
his theory, unlike say Nozick’s, carried forward into wealth distribution the intuitions we 
all share regarding liberties. We don’t think that the less talented deserve a fraction of 
the vote given to the more talented, or less Fifth Amendment protection. We don’t think 
these differences matter when it comes to political citizenship. Harold Pinter deserves all 
kinds of prizes the janitor does not, but he does not deserve two votes to the janitor’s one, 
or a more forgiving standard of proof when before the court. Nor would Pinter at least 
ever say otherwise. Well, the difference principle simply takes this intuition regarding 
equal worth and carries it forward into the possibility of realizing a reasonable life. The 
Rawlsian argument continues: surely all of us, simply as citizens, have an equal claim to 
realize a reasonable life plan. This cannot be something that you can reasonably expect 
satisfied only if you are good at making money; at least, that is the judgment we would 
make from within an initial position of fairness. To respect persons quite apart from 
their talent is to make possible a reasonable life for all regardless of that talent. Hence 
in Sweden, even the unskilled laborer, the janitor say, gets a paid vacation and a reason-
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able work week – so unlike his counterpart in the Bronx! (I am ashamed to say.) And 
so while it is true that the two principles are in some sense lexically structured, it is also 
true that they both speak to and advance the same exact political good, what one might 
call a kind of Kantian respect for persons as such. The justification story that generates 
the first principle, maximal liberty consistent with equal liberty for all, is the exact same 
justification story we appeal to when seeking to justify the equal opportunity principle 
and the difference principle. And because this is so, it is not as if, when enforcing the sec-
ond set of principles concerning the opportunity to acquire wealth and the subsequent 
distribution of wealth once those opportunities have been exercised, we are pursuing 
some good wholly discontinuous from what motivates the argument for equal liberty. 
Indeed, to see these as concerned with different political goods is to play right into the 
hands of a Nozick-like libertarian. After all, respect for persons on the libertarian view 
has been wholly satisfied once the basic liberties are secured; there is now nothing left to 
do in the service of that end. Differences in wealth, as such, are politically innocuous, as 
uninteresting as hair color. From the libertarian point of view, redistribution expresses 
a kind of sentimental charity, a misguided soft heartedness, perhaps. But whatever it is, 
it has nothing to do with respect for persons, which, on the libertarian view is of course 
crucial – and wholly satisfied with generous provisions of liberty. By contrast, for the 
Rawlsian, in all domains, we are pursuing respect for persons regardless of differences of 
talent, period. So it is not obvious, at least to me, that aggressive concern for fair equality 
of opportunity would not engage with, and would not advance, our respect for persons.
Well, what about those basic liberties? Surely these must be in place for fair equality of 
opportunity to be possible, to be a political aspiration, in the first place. Are they or are 
they not “secure” for blacks in America today? Unsurprisingly, I don’t feel very qualified 
to speak to this issue in any detail, but it seems obvious that the answer, broadly, has to be 
a kind of “yes…and no.” I mean, blacks do vote… and are, in some jurisdictions still the 
victims of racially motivated voter suppression tactics. Blacks own property, and some 
accumulate great wealth… and some are still not given a fair chance when applying for a 
mortgage for racially motivated reasons. Some have homes in communities patrolled by 
private security guards, let alone well-funded police; some are the object of frightening 
police harassment and racially motivated attacks causing injury, and even death. Young 
black men face prison for acts like marijuana use that never put their better off white 
counterparts at risk. And so on. I very much doubt anyone would deny any of this, let 
alone Shelby, but more importantly, I don’t see how the undeniability of any of this raises 
any difficulties for his speculative argument. If Shelby forgot to add “and my appeal to 
the fair equal opportunity principle assumes prior, thoroughgoing security of the basic 
liberties,” then, let’s be sports and just add it to the argument on his behalf. What Shelby 
is saying seems to me to be something like this: Maybe Rawls didn’t think very deeply, 
Volume 20, Issue 1Essays in Philosophy
20 | eP1623 Essays in Philosophy
or very helpfully, about race. Fine. But he did think deeply about how a society might 
be structured so that persons, all persons, were respected. And if the arrangements that 
parties would endorse under conditions of fairness were enacted, were made real over 
time, then, for the most part, as these arrangements became stable, persons would be 
respected, and if that were to become so, then, the injuries of racial oppression would be 
ameliorated too, even if these were not aimed at under that description.
Of course, I don’t know if this is true. But then, I don’t know how anyone could know 
whether this is true, by which I mean, I don’t know how anyone could know what long 
term sociological changes we might see were society to strive to be in accord with, and 
come to approximate, Rawls’ two principles of justice. But it cannot be a category mis-
take to think it might be true.
Theorizing Corrective Justice
Finally, let us turn to the alternative approach to correcting racial oppression Mills fa-
vors, his version of Non-Ideal Theory. I want to be fair to Mills; his alternative is only 
sketched out here. But even so, there are serious gaps in the argument that must be faced. 
Here is Mills’ account:
“Can we arrive at these principles [of corrective justice] through the utilization of a Raw-
lsian or modified Rawlsian framework? I believe that we can, but it will require a reori-
entation of Rawls’ apparatus as a “device of representation’….My suggested alternative 
strategy: Rather than try to tweak [Rawlsian principles] let us run a different thought 
experiment, custom designed for non-ideal theory….So the thought experiment plays 
itself differently. Self-knowledge is still blocked by the veil (so as to guarantee objec-
tivity). But the veil is thinner on social knowledge. We know we are going to emerge 
into a society whose basic structure has historically been shaped by white supremacy. 
All the social variants among which we choose will have a white supremacist state as 
their ancestor. ..So we are making a self-interested choice about different principles of 
corrective justice that will correct to a greater or lesser degree for this history of racial 
domination…The choice then becomes this: What kinds of measures would you select 
to correct for a history of racial injustice worried that when the veil lifts, you may turn 
out to be black or a member of some other historically subordinated race?” (212 – 213)
In keeping the parallel with Rawls, Mills first, and understandably, speaks of “choosing 
principles” of corrective justice. Notice that later, he asks which “measures” we would 
choose. The difference in terminology is I think important and revealing, for it is the 
second, more pragmatic language which turns out to express Mills project here more 
accurately. But, first, let us consider this “choice of principle.” Note that we do not get in 
Mills anything like the account we get in Rawls, where Rawls rehearses the assessment 
process by which the parties, in their deliberation, would find utilitarianism wanting say 
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(despite its egalitarianism), and come to rank the two principles of justice over utility. 
Indeed, Mills never even names “the principles of corrective justice” he thinks might be 
chosen by persons in his non-ideal theory, let alone which principles would come in 
second, and why. Truthfully, I am not even sure what a “principle of corrective justice” is.
Let us help the argument out a bit. Perhaps it is something like this: “So long as the direct 
descendant of a wrong is before us, it is just to compensate that party exactly as it would 
have been to compensate the original victim of said wrong.“ Or: “So long as a govern-
ment or state is historically continuous with the government or state that committed an 
initial wrong, it is just that the successor government or state be liable in
the same degree and the same extent as the original government or state.” Such prin-
ciples are hardly obvious or non-controversial. And, again, though Mills never puts for-
ward these principles explicitly, let alone defends them, it is reasonable to think that it 
is something like this that Mills would have his parties choose. After all, taken together, 
they justify policies he likes, such as reparations for the present descendants of the origi-
nal victims of slavery and the Jim Crow state. Now, I am not saying these principles are 
wrong or defective. It may be that these principles are God’s Very Own and would be 
included in the best theory of corrective justice there is. The problem is that I can see no 
argument for their rightness in the thought experiment Mills has constructed.
When we choose the difference principle from within Rawls’ veil, acting on self interest 
and not knowing who we will be, we simply express in a metaphor of game theory an 
argument we can make quite apart from this little illustration. The veil of ignorance il-
lustration is just that – an illustration. Unless the argument it illustrates is itself any good, 
this illustration (or metaphor) can in itself have no power at all. And that argument is es-
sentially the idea that, whatever your talent in the marketplace might be, you are entitled 
to social structure you can endorse, find acceptable. Maybe this argument is more or less 
unassailable, maybe it isn’t. But it is a well-behaved normative argument. A Kantian con-
ception of persons as deserving respect is carried forward into the distribution of wealth; 
this grounds the argument and more importantly for our present purposes, drives the 
illustration. But now, in Mills’ non-ideal version, and perhaps this is a problem with us-
ing this framework in any corrective context, we are simply asking that you assume you 
are one side rather than another in a dispute, and then, drawing on self-interest, rank 
possible principles accordingly. But why should the result now be thought of as vested 
with any normative authority? Who cares that the plaintiff in a tort action wants a rule 
of triple damages? Maybe that rule is right (it sometimes is), maybe not (it sometimes 
isn’t). But asking “suppose when the veil is lifted, you would be the plaintiff in a tort ac-
tion, not the defendant. Should the rule be triple damages or not?” My god, who would 
see the answer to that question as in any way an argument for the rightness of the rule? 
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Why not ask: “Suppose when the veil is lifted, it might be you that was convicted of in-
sider trading; well, from that point of view, from that position of (faux) ignorance, what 
sentence would you want to see imposed?” But I take it as obvious: Before we can ask 
this question, or take an interest in the answer, we need a prior argument for the claim 
that whatever persons would choose in Mills’ story - whatever it is - in any way speaks 
to the rightness of such a choice. And then I am inclined to say: if you do have an argu-
ment along those lines, then, just make that argument. Rephrasing it as what you would 
choose if you might be the victim cannot make it any stronger. Indeed, I think it can only 
diminish it, muddying what presumably would be a well-founded argument of principle 
with ordinary self- interest or partisan politics. If the rule of awarding triple damages 
is the right rule in certain cases, the argument that it is in no way becomes stronger by 
pointing out that if you were the plaintiff, then, this is the rule you would prefer.
Further, without something like the thick, independently justifiable constraints upon 
choice determining the results that we have in an argument like Rawls’, the appeal to 
“what you would choose” is hopelessly indeterminate. We know this from Mills’ own 
book. If it were Tommie Shelby behind Mills’ veil, unlike me, he does not have to “imag-
ine” that he is a member of the disfavored racial group. He is a member of that disfavored 
group – and he knows it! Nevertheless, he would say, and we know this because he has 
said it, and Mills has told us he has said it, “I think we should just choose to enact the 
principles put forward in that classic of white philosophy, John Rawls’ A Theory of Jus-
tice.” I suppose black libertarians (and surely there must be some, since there is every 
version of everything in this mad country of ours) might say, “just make sure all transac-
tions are voluntary and free of fraud; in time, that should be enough to set things right.” 
What does appeal to any “you” get us when, without artificial constraints, this “you” 
could be anyone with any ideology at all? We are back in the unsatisfactory land of R.M. 
Hare’s prescriptivity requirement, and I am surprised Mills doesn’t see this.
Finally, a vaguer thought, one that returns us to the earlier point. Although Mills speaks 
of choosing principles of corrective justice, I think what he is really after is something 
broader - and rightly so. This comes out I think in his more pragmatic talk of mere 
“measures” in the passage above. As I have tried to indicate in the discussion of affirma-
tive action, sometimes the justification for racially self- conscious policies is not exactly 
one of “justice.” And it should not have to be. It may be that certain policies are the right 
policies to pursue, in that we have all sorts of good reasons to pursue them, but we need 
not twist ourselves into the pretzel of justice-talk to make sense of them. It may be that 
no injustice is being “corrected,” just a good thing is being done, a better society is being 
made. When most blacks live in a certain part of Seattle, rather than more or less pro-
portionately across the city, it may or may not be the result of “injustice” that this is so. I 
certainly don’t think the school board should have to prove that it is. I think the school 
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board should be able to say “Look: maybe these housing patterns reflect a deep injustice 
done to blacks here, maybe they are the result of other causal forces. It does not really 
matter. In any event, it is not a good thing for us as a society, or for our children, that all 
the children of black Americans in Seattle go to just these schools; it would be better if 
we had more diversity in our high schools, less racial isolation.” We don’t have to say that 
all measures to combat the legacies of race in this country are correcting for an injus-
tice. All we have to say I think is that it is better if we take these measures and dismantle 
the legacy of racism wherever we can. But figuring out what those measures are, what 
works and what doesn’t – well, here Mills is right all the way down, more right than is 
good for him, as it were. By that I mean, no appeal to any sort of veil of ignorance choice 
theory is going to help, not Rawls’, obviously, but neither will the “Non-Ideal” version 
Mills himself proposes with an assumption of “thicker” social knowledge really help very 
much either. When we look at this awful, sad, maddening legacy of white supremacy and 
racial isolation, we must just try whatever we think might work. And this is something 
we can find out only through actual experience. No one in 1970s America could “know” 
what would and would not work in affirmative action programs. How could they? It all 
lay before us. And clearly, “being a member of a historically disenfranchised minority” 
as Mills asks us to imagine we are when deciding which measures to choose, is no help 
here either. This is social knowledge, acquired only in time, by experience, Membership 
in a certain group may well give you a motive for projects to work, sure. But it cannot tell 
you which “measures” will work. And so, no veil of ignorance argument can work – and 
the “ignorance” is the reason. Kierkegaard put it beautifully when he said life may be un-
derstood backwards, but it must be lived forwards. In the end, for the project Mills most 
wants to address, I am not sure that even the engaged philosophy Mills favors really has 
very much to say.
